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The law relating to Proscription of terrorist organisations as set out in the Terrorism Act 2000 
Jacob Tron, Northumbria University 
 
 “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”- How well does the current law relating 
to proscription of terrorist organisations protect the public and does this law encroach on an 
individual’s Human Rights? 
 
The ability to proscribe an organisation resides with the Home Secretary under s.3 of the 
Terrorism Act 2000. This power allows the Home Secretary to proscribe and deproscribe any 
group who he believes is “concerned with terrorism”.1 Fenwick claims that this is the 
Government’s contribution “towards making the UK a hostile environment for terrorists.”2 This 
over-arching power gives greater responsibility to the police in cases of suspected terrorist 
activity, allowing for the already wide definition of a terrorist from section one of the Act to be 
applied to those who may, in some way be associated with the group. Proscription was originally 
added during the 1960s during the unrest in Northern Ireland3, but aspects of what would now 
be classed as proscription offences originate from the 1930s and the Public Order Act 19364.  In 
the recent year’s, attacks are still being carried out by terrorist groups, killing hundreds and 
inciting fear throughout the world. Proscription is as vital today as it was in the 1960s, shown in 
the attacks carried out in America, New Zealand and the UK itself. Terrorist acts, such as the 
Charlestown shootings in South Carolina, USA, in 2015, the Manchester arena bombing in 2017 
and the attacks in Churchtown, New Zealand in 2019, indicate that groups of all different forms 
carry out acts of terrorism which must be recognised in our own legal system to maximise 
protection for British citizens.  
                                                          
1 Terrorism Act s.3(5) 
2 Helen Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human rights (4th edn, Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 1381 
3 Howard Davis, Human Rights and Civil Liberties (1st edn, Willan Publishing 2003) 336 - 337 
4 ibid 
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A question which remains is whether proscription is wholly effective in the war against terrorism. 
Whilst proscription may be somewhat beneficial in combatting the unrest caused by recent 
terrorist activity, the extent to which it governs and protects citizens is yet to be determined. This 
article will critically analyse and evaluate the Terrorism Act 2000, in particular s.3 and the powers 
of proscription, in terms of restrictions to human rights and civil liberties, as well as assess the 
classification of a terrorist and the issues regarding its wide-reaching definition. 
 
Defining terrorism 
 
In order to be able to fully comprehend the powers of proscription, one must first be able to 
understand what a terrorist is and how it is defined in the legislation. Prior to the Terrorism Act 
2000, the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 19895 defined terrorism as “the 
use of violence for political ends and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the 
public or any section of the public in fear.”6 This early definition focuses on the use of violence 
and whilst modern society acknowledge that terrorism can now take many forms, the most 
prolific and anticipated type of terrorism is violence. S.1 of the Terrorism Act 20007 redefined 
terrorism, giving it a broader definition of: 
 
 “Terrorism means the use or threat of action where – (B) The use or threat is 
designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of 
people and (C) the use or threat us made for the purpose of advancing a political, 
religious or ideological cause”8.  
 
                                                          
5 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 
6 The prevention of terrorism (Temporary provisions) Act 1989 
7 Terrorism Act 2000 
8 Terrorism Act 2000 s.1(1) 
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The term “action” is defined in sub-section two as “(A) involving serious violence against a 
person;(B) serious damage to property; (C) endangering a person’s life;(D) creates a serious risk 
to the health and safety of the public or; (E) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously 
disrupt an electronic system.”9 Further amendments have since been made as a result of the 
Terrorism Act 2006 s.34, which now includes “international governmental organisation”10 and 
provides a definition that is no longer confined to the United Kingdom.  
 
Several issues could potentially arise with the definition of a terrorist; one of which is principally 
concerned with the nature of the definition itself and its lack of restrictions in terms of who 
cannot be a terrorist. The possibility of being characterised as a terrorist is not exempt from acts 
of armed conflict concerning foreign government. David Anderson states that “no express 
exemption for acts carried out overseas that constitute lawful hostilities under international 
humanitarian law11”. It could therefore be argued that the definition of “terrorism” is somewhat 
similar to that of a strict liability offence as it is indiscriminate of all forms of conflict that have 
the potential to be seen as a terrorist act. For example, posting videos of groups exercising “self-
defence by people resisting invasion of their country”12 in R v Gul13, or in R v Z14, which concerned 
a group in Ireland named the Real IRA arguing that as they are not a proscribed group there is no 
ground for them to be labelled terrorists.  
 
To further my point, the case of R v Gul15, regarding the appellants argument concerning the 
parameters of the domestic laws powers into activities concerning terrorism, acknowledged the 
                                                          
9 Terrorism Act 2000 s.1(2) 
10 Terrorism Act 2006 s.34 
11 David Anderson qc, 'The Terrorism Act in 2012' [2013] Independent reviewer of Terrorism legislation 
<https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Report-on-the-
Terrorism-Acts-in-2012-FINAL_WEB1.pdf> accessed 20 April 2018 
12 Regina v Gul (Mohammed) [2014] AC 1260 
13 ibid 
14 R v Z  [2005] 3 All ER 95 
15 Regina v Gul (Mohammed)  [2014] AC 1260 
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sheer breadth of s.116.  It was stated that even if a State sanctioned military activity was carried 
out to influence another government, it could fall under the definition of terrorism. Although 
they do accept that this concept is only accepted by considering the meaning of terrorism, it 
reinforces the view that with a definition so vast certain activities such as acting in self-defence 
against an oppressive regime or even publicly supporting said rebellion could be classed as acts 
of terrorism. This point is further supported by Fenwick, who argues that “use of violence by 
civilians against an invader… thus label all resistance movements terrorist groups; they 
potentially cover almost all liberation movements, whether or not fighting against an 
undemocratic regime which does not respect human rights.”17   
 
The process of proscription and deproscription 
 
Tim Legrand gave a direct explanation of the weight of the power given to the Home Secretary 
by s.3 stating that “proscription regimes require political executives to successfully narrate the 
existence of an identifiable and coherent organisation committed to a discernible, and 
illegitimate, political motive”18. Aside from s.3 of the Terrorism Act 2000 giving power to the 
Home Secretary to add a terrorist organisation to Schedule 2 of the Act, it also gives guidelines 
as to what warrants being put on the register. S.3(5)19 outlines four criteria which indicate a group 
is “concerned in terrorism”; they consist of “(a)Commits or participates in acts of terrorism, (b) 
prepares for terrorism, (c) promotes or encourages terrorism, or (d) is otherwise concerned in 
terrorism”20 . The Terrorism Act 2006 went on to further expand the definition on part (c) to 
include the “unlawful glorification” of terrorism. There are 88 proscribed groups21 which fulfil the 
                                                          
16 Ibid, [26] – [41] 
17 Helen Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human rights (4th edn, Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 1380 
18 Tim Legrand and Lee Jarvis, 'Proscription Powers and Their Use in the UK' [2014] 9(4) British Politics 
<https://nsc.crawford.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publication/nsc_crawford_anu_edu_au/2017-
05/legrand_jarvis_2014_enemies-of-the-state-article.pdf> accessed 20 April 2018 
19 Terrorism Act 2000 S.3(5) 
20 ibid 
21 Home office , 'List of Proscribed organisations' 
(Servicegovukhttps://assetspublishingservicegovuk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/6
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criteria of being a proscribed organisation, 14 relating to Irish Terrorism while the 74 others are 
international terrorist organisations. The power of proscription is given to the Home Secretary, 
however, there is no need for there to be a reasonable belief and it remains a subjective process 
at his discretion with little involvement from the executive. The phrase “concern in terrorism”22 
opens the definition up to a level of uncertainty, as who could fall under s.1’s definition of a 
terrorist. This point is argued by both Davis and Fenwick, who claimed that because of the phrase 
“the definition of terrorism is extended because a range of people become terrorist subjects”23. 
This, in turn has the potential to open the definition to scrutiny as well as have the potential to 
violate Article 1124 (freedom of association) of the European Convention of Human Rights. In the 
case of O’Driscoll vs Secretary of State for the Home Department,25 the defendant was arrested 
and detained on suspicion of committing an offence under s.16 of the Terrorism Act 2000. The 
courts found that “Section 16 was not about freedom of expression but about knowingly 
providing money or other property to support a proscribed organisation. So long as the 
organisation was properly proscribed, s.16 could not be regarded as disproportionate” therefore 
it was found not to infringe Article 11 in that no body of government should over extend what is 
necessary to achieve their intended objective. 
 
If an organisation believes it has been wrongly proscribed by the Home Secretary, they can appeal 
to be deproscribed from the list of terrorist parties. The Terrorism Act 2000 provides a 
mechanism to repeal an organisation, again, at the Home Secretary’s discretion; stating “the 
Secretary of State may by order (b) Remove an organisation from that schedule”26. If the Home 
Secretary refuses the application, a final resort can be taken of a further appeal to the Proscribed 
                                                          
70599/20171222_Proscriptionpdf, 22 december 2017) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/670599/20
171222_Proscription.pdf> accessed 20 April 2018 
22 Terrorism Act 2000 
23 Helen Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human rights (4th edn, Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 1381 
24 European Convection of Human Rights Article 11 
25 R (on the application of O’Driscoll) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] EWHC 2477 (Admin), 
[2002] All ER (D) 327 (Nov) 
26 Terrorism Act 2000 S.3(3) 
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Organisations Appeal Commission (POAC); the process of which is found in s.5 of the Act27. 
However, when scrutinising the process of deproscription it can be held that some issues arise; 
namely, the level of power given to the Home Secretary. This is seen in the case of the Peoples 
Mujahedin Of Iran (PMOI)28, who, after being refused twice by the Home Secretary, due to 
previous military activity which had since ceased29, appealed to the POAC who allowed their 
application, claiming that the Home Secretary had misinterpreted the law when considering the 
first part of the two-pronged test30. This case also created a guide for a greater understanding of 
what it means to be “concerned with terrorism” and reiterated the test which should be applied 
when considering the deproscription of terrorist groups. Prior to its proscription in 2001, the 
PMOI had carried out acts of violence in opposition the Government of the Shah of Iran. The 
reasons for the group’s proscription was well founded and it was agreed that at that time the 
group had carried out acts which were “concerned with terrorism”.31 At the time of their appeal 
application to the POAC, the group had henceforth ended all military action in an attempt to 
legitimise their campaign in pursuit of a peaceful democratic movement. The Home Secretary 
argued that the potential for the group to revert to its previous campaign of terrorist activity 
satisfied the definition of s.3(5) justifying her reasoning as to why she previously denied their 
appeal in both applications. The reasoning for her rejection was contended to be unfounded by 
the POAC and interfered with fundamental human rights. Through scrutiny of the Home 
Secretary’s decision and both open and closed hearings, the groups was found to not be 
“concerned with terrorism”32 and therefore there was no longer a justifiable reason as to keep 
the group proscribed.33 The amount of successful deproscription appeals indicate both the strict 
test and the disproportionate level of power given to the Home Secretary. There have only been 
two successful cases from the Act being brought into force, both of which have been appealed 
by the POAC. From the outset of the appeal process, both cases were denied by the Home 
                                                          
27 Terrorism Act 2000 S.5  
28 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Lord Alton of Liverpool and others [2008] EWCA Civ 443 
29 Nathan Rasiah, Reviewing Proscription under the Terrorism Act 2000, 13 Jud. Rev. 187 (2008) 
30Secretary of State for the Home Department v Lord Alton of Liverpool and others [2008] EWCA Civ 443. 
31 Terrorism Act s.3(5) 
32 ibid 
33 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Lord Alton of Liverpool and others [2008] EWCA Civ 443 
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Secretary on grounds that were later quashed, demonstrating a failure in adequately apply the 
test to deproscribe terrorist groups. It is understandable that in terms of terrorist activity those 
groups must be held to account for the acts they have committed. However, if the group is no 
longer affiliated with and does not carry out acts that are defined in the Act, it is the task of the 
Home Secretary to deproscribe that group as per S.5 of the act.34 
 
Proscription related offences 
 
If s.3 of the Terrorism Act 2000 is a legal definition as to what constitutes proscription, then 
sections 11 to 1335 of the same Act are offences based on the affiliations of organisations in 
Schedule 2. S.11 of the Terrorism Act makes it an offence to profess any association with an 
organisation. S11(1) states that “A person commits an offence if he belongs or professes to 
belong to a proscribed organisation”36. However, s11(2) does allow for a defence against the 
involvement in a proscribed group. To prove one’s innocence, one must prove that at the time 
of joining the organisation the group was not listed in Schedule 2, and that they have not taken 
part in any activities relating to the group while it was proscribed37. A prominent issue with this 
defence relates to the presumption of innocence, a right found in Article 6 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights. The case of Sheldrake v DPP focused on the type of defence that 
was needed to fulfil the exception of s.11(2); it being evidential as well as being a negative38 
meaning the defendant would have to prove that they took no part in the activity of the 
organisation. This, however would suggest that the defendant was guilty during the trial and 
needed to prove his innocence. A statement by Lord Bingham from Sheldrake39 argued the 
appropriateness of the section and what it imposes on defendants, saying “any blameworthy or 
                                                          
34 Terrorism Act 2000 S.5 
35 Terrorism Act 2000 s.11-13 
36 Terrorism Act 2000 s. 11 
37 Terrorism Act 2000 s.11(2) 
38 Ruth Costigan and Richard Stone, Civil Liberties and Human Rights (11th edn, Oxford University Press 2017) 57 
39 Sheldrake v Director of Public Prosecutions; Attorney General's Reference (No 4 of 2002) [2004] UKHL 43 
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properly criminal conduct may fall within s11(1). There would be a clear breach of the 
presumption of innocence and a real risk of unfair conviction”40.  
 
Further offences relating to proscription are contained in sections 12 and 13 of the Terrorism Act 
200041;  both involve showing support for any proscribed organisation. S.12(1) finds it an offence 
if “a person (A) invites support for a proscribed organisation; and (B) the support is not, or is not 
restricted to, the provision of money or other property”42. It is also an offence if a person: 
 
 “arranges, manages, or assists in arranging or managing a meeting which he 
knows is – (A) to support a proscribed organisation; (B) to further the activities of 
a proscribed organisation; or (C) to be addressed by a person who belongs or 
professes to belong to a proscribed organisation”43. 
 
 Similar to that of the s.11, the defence to this crime bares an evidential burden not a legal one44. 
The final offence that is connected to proscription concerning uniform, which holds a similarity 
to section one of the public order act 1936 concerning political uniforms in public spaces45. 
S.13(1) of the Terrorism Act characterises the offence as: 
 
 “a person … if he: (A) wears and item of clothing; or (B) wears, carries or displays 
an article; in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion 
that he is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation”46.  
                                                          
40Sheldrake v Director of Public Prosecutions; Attorney General's Reference (No 4 of 2002) [2004] UKHL 43 s.51 
41 Terrorism Act 2000  
42 Terrorism act 2000 s.12 
43 ibid 
44 Alun Jones, Rupert Bowers and Hugo Lodge, Blackstones Guide to the Terrorism Act 2006 (Oxford University 
Press New York) 
45 Public Order Act 1936 section 1 
46 Ruth Costigan and Richard Stone, Civil Liberties and Human Rights (11th edn, Oxford University Press 2017) 57 
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When looking at these offences from a human rights standpoint, it could be argued that they 
infringe both Articles 10 and 11, freedom of speech and freedom of association respectively. 
Whilst these sections could amount to proscription related offences, one could argue that they 
are just normal activities in day to day society which as a result of legislation, may now be 
perceived as hostile and raise suspicion of support of terrorist action. As previously stated, 
legislation surrounding terrorist activity is indiscriminate in its power. Groups who fight for peace 
in foreign countries and far less extreme groups who use shock to convey their point could be 
considered as committing terrorist activity under the definitions of sections one and three47. It is 
therefore contended that by extension anyone who could be seen as supporting these groups in 
some way may be seen as committing acts linked to terrorism and proscription. A substantial 
quote from Lord Hoffman however, explains as to why some restrictions can be sanctioned for 
the good of society stating, “Individual freedom should only be restricted when there is a real 
and pressing need to do so”48 and when that restriction is disproportionate with the outcome, 
the democratic system becomes unbalanced and the foundations of democracy crumble without 
freedom to express one’s political beliefs49.  
 
Possible reform 
 
From its original aims to curtail the powers of the Irish Republican Army and other splinter 
groups, the law on proscription has been amended several times to widen the definition but it 
poses the question as to whether this power supports law enforcers in protecting the UK against 
terrorism. Proscription has arguably been seen as a positive method to “discourage supporters 
of terrorist organisations”50. However, other sources such as Clive Walker believe “it’s 
detrimental effects in terms of constraining the free expression of views about Northern Ireland 
                                                          
47 ibid 
48 Ruth Costigan and Richard Stone, Civil Liberties and Human Rights (11th edn, Oxford University Press 2017) 454 
49 Helen Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human rights (4th edn, Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 
50 ibid 
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outweigh its benefits”51.  There are several potential reforms that could amend the current law 
on proscription. One recommendation put forward by David Anderson in his annual report 
focuses on setting a time limit before organisations may be considered for deproscription. He 
states “proscription orders should lapse after a period of time and be renewed only if there is 
sufficient evidence to do so”52. Another point put forward by Anderson relates to when the 
Secretary of State denies deproscription. Suggesting that reasons should be given in full to gain 
a greater understanding as to why groups have been denied and how this will affect their 
appeal53. Although the appeal reasoning differs in R v Z54, the case still remains relevant to the 
recommendation. The reason for this appeal relates to the name of their proscribed group, 
although not actually a listed group under Schedule 2, the defendants were charged as belonging 
to a proscribed organisation, the ‘Real IRA’. This is because as an umbrella term, the IRA related 
to all splinter groups surrounding what was one of the original reasons proscription was 
introduced. In doing this, the courts forsake groups that may not have used violent acts, branding 
all those groups who work under a name similar to that of the IRA as terrorist groups. These, 
however, could conflict with the current process of appeals. When looking at the current process 
under the Secretary of State, the two-point test that he follows makes little space for evidence 
as seen in the appeal process of PMOI55. The evidence of the organisation indicated their lack of 
criminal activity, yet they remained listed due to the Secretary of States’ misinterpretation of the 
phrase “concerned in terrorism”.  
 
To conclude, Fenwick encapsulates the original intentions of the Terrorism Act 2000 at the start 
of the 21st century with the claim, “the TA has four key hallmarks, it is far more extensive, 
covering a much wider range of groups; it is permanent; its main provisions apply equally 
throughout the UK and it retains almost all the draconian special powers and offences adopted 
                                                          
51 David Anderson Q.Q. “Independent review on Terrorism Laws; Searchlight or Veil” Cmnd 8803 [1983] 
52 David Anderson qc, 'The Terrorism Act in 2015' [2016] Independent reviewer of Terrorism legislation 
https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/TERRORISM-ACTS-
REPORT-1-Dec-2016-1.pdf accessed 20 april 2018 
53 ibid 
54 R v Z - [2005] 3 All ER 95 
55 Secretary of State for the Home Department v Lord Alton of Liverpool and others [2008] EWCA Civ 443. 
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under the previous temporary counter-terrorism scheme, whilst adding new incitement 
offences”56. With terrorism becoming much more of a prominent threat in society, legislation 
must remain ever changing to combat the problem. The process of proscription is one that must 
remain up to date with current world-wide state of affairs in order to maintain its protection on 
the citizens of the UK. However, the legislature and law enforcement must be able to strike a 
balance between exercising their power to penalise those concerned with terrorism while using 
their “wide, even intrusive, powers”57 to a degree that is accepted and proportional to the harm 
which could be incurred. The public must have access to the protection of Human Rights and the 
freedom to express their religious and political views without fear of being branded a terrorist. 
                                                          
56 Helen Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human rights (4th edn, Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 
57 Regina v Gul (Mohammed) [2014] AC 1260 
